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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
agent, ' ' or decided as a matter of law that the father's knowledge of tle
mother's negligence constituted contributory negligcncc on his part.
It this case of first impression the Florida Supreme Court seens
needlessly to have missed the opportunity to clarify its position. Without
weighing the merits of the conflicting views, it appears, none the less,
that a clear alignment with one of the lines of authority would have been
a positive good in and of itself.
FRANK MPI. DUSBAUGII III
LAST CLEAR CHANCE-COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of her husband arising out of
a collision between the deceased's truck and the defendant's train. The
jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff based on the judge's charge embodying
th doctrine of last clear chance. On appeal, reversed. Held, the doctrine
of last clear chance no longer applies to railroad comparative negligence
cases.' Loftin v. Nolin, 86 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1956).
At common law, when a defendant is successful in establishing the
defense of contributory negligence, it serves as a complete bar to recovery.2
The hardship of the doctrine of contributory negligence upon the plaintiff
has led to various efforts to avoid it. The most commonly accepted modi-
fication of the strict rule of contributory negligence is the doctrine of
last clear chance,' which had its origin in 1842 in the English case of
Davies v .Mann.4 The rationale of the doctrine is that the last wrongdoer
is necessarily the worst wrongdoer, or at least the decisive one, and should
pay.5 An entirely different approach used to avoid the complete bar of
contributory negligence and last clear chance is the doctrine of comparative
22. See Agdeppa v. Clougie, 71 Cal. App. 2d 463, 162 P.2d 944 (1945); Wheat's
Adm'r. v. Gray, 309 Ky. 593, 218 S.W.2d 400 (1949); Darbrinsky v. Pennsylania Co.,
248 Pa. 503, 94 AtI. 269 (1915 ; Nichols v. Nashville Housing Authority, 187 Tenn.
683, 216 S.W.2d 694 (1949). Contra, Phillips v. Denver City Trarnway Co., 53 Colo.
458, 128 Pac. 460 (1912); Ierrell v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry, 324 Mo. 38,
23 S.W.2d 102 (1929); Los Angeles & S. L. R.R. v. Urnbaugh, 61 Nev. 214, 123
P.2d 224 (1942); Humphreys v. Ash, 90 N.H. 223, 6 A.2d 436 (19 39 ), MacDonald
v. O'Reilly, 45 Ore. 589, 78 Pac. 753 (1904); Home v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
177 S.C. 461, 181 S.E. 642 (1935).
1. By statute in Florida (FLA. STAT. § 768,06 (1953] the doctrine of comparative
negligence is applied in railroad cases.
. . . If the plaintiff and the agents of the [railroad] company are both at
fault, the former may recover, but the amount of recovery shall be such a
proportion of the entire damages sustained as the defendant's negligence bears
to the combined negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant.
2.. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 467 (1934).
3. The most often stated explanation of the doctrine of last clear chance is
that if the defendant has the last clear opportunity to avoid the harm, the plaintiff's
negligence is not a proximate cause of the result. Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn.
109, 84 Atl. 301 (1912); Rottman v. Beverly. 183 La. 947, 955, 165 So. 153 (1936);
Fuller v. Illinois Central Ry., 100 Miss. 705. 716. 56 So. 783 (1911); Bragg v, Central
New England Ry., 228 N.Y. 54. 126 N.E. 253 (1920).
4. 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842).
5. PROSSER, TORTS at 292 (1955).
CASENOTES
negligence. The latter doctrine is rejected by common law authorities,6
except for the jurisprudence of admiralty7 and as provided for by statute.'
The doctrine of last clear chance is seemingly unlimited in its applica-
tion in Florida.9 The problem arises when the last clear chance doctrine
is applied to comparative negligence cases.' 0  The court in the instant
case had strong justification for overruling the Poindexter v. Seaboard Airline
Ry. 11 case, where ain automobile collided with defendant's train (stationary
across the highway). Here, it was conceded that the plaintiff was negligent
in failing to observe the dangers surrounding him as he approached the
crossing, but the trial court felt the issue of last clear chance on the
part of the railroad should be submitted to the jury. The plaintiff was
awarded damages.
In the instant case, the court also overruled the Seaboard Airline Ry.
v. Martin'2 case, where it was said:
In this kind of case under the statute the contributory negligence
is not a complete bar to recovery. When it appears, the doctrine
of comparative negligence is applied, and then the doctrine of last
6. Kentucky & I. Bridge & R. Co. v. Sydnor, 119 Ky. 18, 82 S.W. 989 (1904);
Belle Alliance Co. v. Texas & P.R. Co., 125 La. 777, 51 So. 846 (1910); Gibbard
v. Cursan, 255 Mich. 311, 196 N.W. 398 (1923); Bartson v. Craig, 121 Ohio St. 371,
169 N.E. 291 (1929); \Vaynick v. Walrond, 155 Va. 400, 154 S.E. 522 (1930).
While the doctrine formerly prevailed in Illinois, it is no longer recognized in any
state and is expressly repudiated in most states.
7. The Schooner Catherine, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854); The Margaret,
30 F.2d 903 (3rd Cir. 1929).
8. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§
51-59 (1952); FLA. STAT. §§ 768.06 769.03 (1953); GA. ANN. CODE § 2781 (1914);
IOWA CODE § 8158 (1927); MINN. STAT. § 4935 (1927); VA. CODE ANrN. § 3959
(1930); Ws. STAT. § 192.55 (2,3) 1927).
9. See Consumer's Lumber and Veneer Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 117
F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1943)(collision of train and truck); Yousko v. Vogt, 63 So.2d 193
(Fla. 1953)(collision of scooter and automobile); Davis v. Cuesta, 146 Fla. 471,
1 So.2d 475 (1941) (collision of automobiles); Lindsay v. Thomas, 128 Fla. 293. 174
So. 418 (1937)(collision of automobile and pedestrian).
In Florida, last clear chance is an extension of the law of contributory negligence,
not an exception to it. "It [last clear chance] does not permit one to recover in
spite of his contributory negligence, but merely operates to relieve the negligence of a
plaintiff . . . which would otherwise be regarded as contributory, from its character as
such." Merchant's Transportation Co. v. Daniel, 109 Fla. 496, 502, 149 So. 401,
403 (1933).
In several iurisdictions the last clear chance doctrine is not available to a defendant.
It appears the reasoning is that since contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
seeking recovery is essential to the application of the doctrine of last clear chance, the
doctrine is not in any proper sense susceptible of being invoked by the defendant
against the plaintiff because before that state can be reached, plaintiff's recovery
is barred by his own contributory negligence. Wolff v. Stenger, 59 S.D. 231, 239
N.W. 181 (1931)
For an excellent survey see Steinhardt and Simon, Florida's Last Clear Chance
Doctrine, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 457 (1953).
10. See Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Martin. 56 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1952); Poindexter
v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 56 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1951)(the decisions in the foregoing
cases were overruled by the instant case).
11. Supra note 10. The comparative negligence statute was not in issue here
although it would seem to control.
12. Supra note 10.
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clear chance comes into being, if the evidence so warrants, as it
does in this case.18
The trial court in the Martin case entered judgment for the plaintiff.
The case concerned an automobile-train collision, where the automobile
(proceeding parallel to the tracks) attempted a turn onto the tracks.
Ostensibly, the court characterized the negligence of the train's engineer,
in failing to utilize the opportunity to stop upon notice of the automobile,
as the sole proximate cause of the injury. The holding seems well reasoned.
The court in the instant case, however, relying on eminent text authorities14
as a basis for overruling the Martin case, stated that last clear chance
instructions in such instances are without reason or justification. The
reasoning by which the court reaches this conclusion is not apparent from
a reading of the case.
Viewed from a policy standpoint, the court is using the comparative
negligence statute as a shield for the railroad. Interestingly enough, the
same statute has been criticised as being too harsh to the railroad. 15
Perhaps the instant case is indicative of judicial modification of anti-railroad
legislation. From the legal aspect, the doctrine of last clear chance in
comparative negligence cases must be considered to determine whether
or not the defendant's negligence is the sole proximate cause of the
accident. If it is, there is no need to apply the comparative negligence
statute, and even in situations where the negligence of both plaintiff and
defendant concurred to produce the injury, the doctrine of last clear chance,
used in a relative sense, is still needed to determine the degree of defendant's
negligence, thus enabling an apportionment of damages according to the
comparative negligence statute.'6
SnLv N. HOLTZMAN
REAL PROPERTY-BUILDING RESTRICTIONS-
PROPERTY RIGHTS
In a suit by an incorporated town to enjoin the Board of Public
Instruction from erecting or operating a public school, the question arose
as to whether or not private building restrictions constitute "property" in
the sense that compensation must be paid to their owners as part of eminent
domain proceedings. Held, that such restrictions are not compensible.
13. Id. at 512.
14. James, Last Clear Chance-A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938);
Maclntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1225 (1940);
Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13 NACCA L. J. 195 (1951); Recent Statute, 52
HARv. L. REV. 1187 (1938). Using text authorities as the basis for a decision is
considered by many to be unusual.
15. Loftin v. Crowley, 150 Fla. 836, 8 So.2d 909 (1942) (where the court
refused to declare the statute unconstitutional merely because motor carriers were
not made liable under similar circumstances).
16. In Martin v. Sussman, 82 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1955), the court, in citing the case
under note, stated that the doctrine of last clear chance is no longer applicable in suits
against a railroad company, without qualifying the doctrine and its relation to proximate
cause.
